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How we can immediately grasp the meaning of the actions of others? As we understand intentions and emotions? For centuries, philosophers and physicians of the soul looking for the answer. But in the last decade is the neurophysiology to offer the most promising way. They have identified neurons (mirror neurons) with a surprising prprietà : activate both when we perform a given action is when we see others do. This extraordinary discovery, the theoretical and experimental investigations that have made it possible for the first time are covered in this book. It is not only original exploration of the neural mechanisms that underlie many of our individual and social behavior, but an innovative indagnie evolution of intelligence and emotion, thought and language. An inquiry set to transform the way we understand the functions of the mind and to influence psychology, anthropology, ethics and aesthetics.
This of neuroscientist Giacomo Rizzolatti and Corrado Sinigaglia philosopher was certainly a book to do. The book contains the essay form of literature that has marked out along the search path around the discovery and interpretation of canonical neurons and mirror neurons. Has it all in these pages: the legions of fans (not just neuroscience field but often philosophical or psychological linguistic anthropology) will find here all the experiments and related theoretical results and interpretations which have enthusiastically followed the development in these years, attracted many curious "empathy neurons" they read in the newspapers or heard during meetings or presentations will provide a tool comprehensive and clear to take stock of the state of the art of this research have revolutionized our understanding of the architecture and functioning of the brain.
The central argument around which articulated the seven chapters of the book is that "the brain works is also and above all a brain that includes". The meaning and scope of this thesis lie in the heart of the neural mechanism identified by neurophysiologists at the University of Parma coordinated by Giacomo Rizzolatti. In a series of studies conducted over the past two decades, researchers have discovered in the premotor cortex of the monkey and then also the existence of the human two groups of neurons are both active during the execution of actions related to objects: they are simple and familiar gestures such as grabbing something with your hand or bringing food to the mouth. The surprising thing is that these two groups of premotor neurons are activated in the absence of any explicit enforcement action in purely observational tasks: the first group of neurons respond to the vision of the object where the action could be given to those in the second 'observation of another individual who performs the same action.
Following the authors we take the example of coffee cup: the premotor neurons are activated while you grasp the handle, but for some of their activation is triggered even by simple observation of the cup resting on the table for others, the observation of our neighbor who grabs her to drink his coffee. It is therefore in both cases of bimodal neurons in motor and perceptual set whose activity can be described by the same mechanism simulation: during the observation of an object activates a motor pattern appropriate to its characteristics (such as size and orientation in space) "as if the viewer enters into interaction with it, and likewise during the observation of an action performed by another individual, the neural system activates the observer" as if " was himself to take the same action it observes. The neurons of the first group were called "canonical neurons" because from the thirties had suggested the involvement of the premotor areas in the processing of visual information about an object in the motor actions necessary to interact with it, the second group were called "mirror neurons" because they cause a reaction mirrored in the observer's neural system in which a simulation of the observed implied.
In light of this mechanism for neural simulation can be reinterpreted the role of the entire cognitive system within the motor system usually associated only with the planning and execution of actions: the bimodal neurons found in the premotor cortex are strongly implicated in cognitive processes, particularly in high-level perceptual recognition of objects and actions and understanding of their meaning. It is therefore less rigid border between the cognitive processes of perception and motor for years has characterized the interpretation of brain architecture: understanding perception and action are grouped together into a unified mechanism which is precisely "the brain is also and above all acting which includes a brain. " Understanding with regard to items related to their functional significance or affordance; canonical neurons allow an immediate understanding of the opportunities for interaction that objects offer a perceiving subject (in the case of the handle of the coffee cup can be grasped). As regards the shares understanding about the purpose that underlies them: mirror neurons allow an immediate understanding of the intentions of individuals (eg the intention to bring the cup to his mouth to drink the coffee) making possible a forecast of their future behavior.
The book faithfully reflects the key experiments on monkeys and on human beings. Obviously the techniques used are very different: while in monkeys it is possible to make a record of single neuron by insertion of intracortical electrodes in human subjects using only non-invasive methods of brain imaging such as positron emission tomography (PET) or functional magnetic resonance imaging ( fMRI) that allow you to view the activity of whole brain areas but not to individual nerve cells. In the fourth chapter
Act describes two experiments and understanding central to defining the role of mirror neurons in the understanding of the purpose underlying the actions. The first revealed the existence of a mirror mechanism not only mode but also auditory and visual motor when the monkey is in darkness and listen to the noise produced by an action: the same neuron "low" when the animal breaks when she sees someone break a peanut and when he hears the sound of someone who breaks. Regardless of how the neuron is activated to encode the abstract concept to "break" that matches the goal with the intention of the action. The second experiment has instead allowed to discriminate between a grasping gesture intended to bring food to your mouth or put it in a container during execution of that action (grasp) mirror neurons are activated in different ways depending on the ultimate goal of the action including his intention to bring food to the mouth or move it to the container. In the same direction seem to get some results with humans from an experiment with fMRI: was noted in the experimental subjects particularly significant activation of the mirror neuron system during observation of actions is not "pure" but placed in the context of actions by which one could infer clearly the intention that there was implied. All of these experiments to indicate that the "mirror neuron system is able to encode not only the act but also noted the intention with which it is finished." In agreement with the paradigm of 'embodied cognition the intentions of others can be included without any conceptual or linguistic reflective mediation: it is a pragmatic understanding "based solely on the motor knowledge on which depends our own capacity to act." In the sixth chapter
Imitation and language are described in two other important functions attributed to the mirror neuron system: an imitative function is understood as the ability to replicate gestures already members of our own motor repertoire is the ability to learn new motor patterns by imitation ; a communicative function that should allow for a possible scenario on the origin of human language related to the evolution of the mirror system.
the theme of sharing emotions is devoted the last chapter of the book: "The recognition of the emotions of others is based on a set of neural circuits that share the property as different mirror already seen in the case of action understanding." was possible to study experimentally some primary emotions: The results clearly show that observed in the other an expression of pain or disgust activates the same neural substrate underlying the perception in the first person of the same type of emotion. Further confirmation comes from clinical trials patients with neurological diseases: a time lost the ability to feel and express a given emotion becomes impossible to recognize even when expressed by others. As in the case of actions for the emotions one can speak of an immediate understanding that does not require cognitive processes of inferential or associative: "The immediate understanding of the emotions of others is the necessary prerequisite for that empathic behavior that underlies a large part of our relations interindividual.
Far from being confined to the functioning of certain nerve cells mirror the properties and then pervade the entire brain system: the same logic that allows coupled execution and action understanding in a single neural mechanism for describing the condivisine emotional and perhaps even the phenomenon of consciousness. In a recent paper published in "Science" Anna Berti neuropsychology has identified a similar mechanism of neural coupling for the execution of actions and awareness of them (or not having) done: the awareness that mobility allows us to be aware of our actions share the same neural substrate underlying the motor control of the shares in question. This happy
publishing operation in which the neuroscientist father of mirror neurons was accompanied by a philosopher is proposed from Cambridge University in the series "Science and Ideas in the theme of interdisciplinarity that is his strong point. However, in this case it is worth reflecting on just how Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia understood the relationship between science and philosophy. At the philosophical method has been given the task almost "editorial" to make clear in the exposition and to ensure appropriate use of terms such as "intend", "pragmatic understanding" or "empathy" which certainly belong to the vocabulary of the philosopher who most of the scientist. About the content no further reference to philosophy (apart from some park reference to the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty) is superimposed on the intrinsic philosophical framework that emerges spontaneously from the exposure of scientific experiments: the proposal of the two authors involves the creation of an interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy and neuroscience, but decided the claim that science is itself philosophy. (Francesca Garbarini, Index)
The central argument around which articulated the seven chapters of the book is that "the brain works is also and above all a brain that includes". The meaning and scope of this thesis lie in the heart of the neural mechanism identified by neurophysiologists at the University of Parma coordinated by Giacomo Rizzolatti. In a series of studies conducted over the past two decades, researchers have discovered in the premotor cortex of the monkey and then also the existence of the human two groups of neurons are both active during the execution of actions related to objects: they are simple and familiar gestures such as grabbing something with your hand or bringing food to the mouth. The surprising thing is that these two groups of premotor neurons are activated in the absence of any explicit enforcement action in purely observational tasks: the first group of neurons respond to the vision of the object where the action could be given to those in the second 'observation of another individual who performs the same action.
Following the authors we take the example of coffee cup: the premotor neurons are activated while you grasp the handle, but for some of their activation is triggered even by simple observation of the cup resting on the table for others, the observation of our neighbor who grabs her to drink his coffee. It is therefore in both cases of bimodal neurons in motor and perceptual set whose activity can be described by the same mechanism simulation: during the observation of an object activates a motor pattern appropriate to its characteristics (such as size and orientation in space) "as if the viewer enters into interaction with it, and likewise during the observation of an action performed by another individual, the neural system activates the observer" as if " was himself to take the same action it observes. The neurons of the first group were called "canonical neurons" because from the thirties had suggested the involvement of the premotor areas in the processing of visual information about an object in the motor actions necessary to interact with it, the second group were called "mirror neurons" because they cause a reaction mirrored in the observer's neural system in which a simulation of the observed implied.
In light of this mechanism for neural simulation can be reinterpreted the role of the entire cognitive system within the motor system usually associated only with the planning and execution of actions: the bimodal neurons found in the premotor cortex are strongly implicated in cognitive processes, particularly in high-level perceptual recognition of objects and actions and understanding of their meaning. It is therefore less rigid border between the cognitive processes of perception and motor for years has characterized the interpretation of brain architecture: understanding perception and action are grouped together into a unified mechanism which is precisely "the brain is also and above all acting which includes a brain. " Understanding with regard to items related to their functional significance or affordance; canonical neurons allow an immediate understanding of the opportunities for interaction that objects offer a perceiving subject (in the case of the handle of the coffee cup can be grasped). As regards the shares understanding about the purpose that underlies them: mirror neurons allow an immediate understanding of the intentions of individuals (eg the intention to bring the cup to his mouth to drink the coffee) making possible a forecast of their future behavior.
The book faithfully reflects the key experiments on monkeys and on human beings. Obviously the techniques used are very different: while in monkeys it is possible to make a record of single neuron by insertion of intracortical electrodes in human subjects using only non-invasive methods of brain imaging such as positron emission tomography (PET) or functional magnetic resonance imaging ( fMRI) that allow you to view the activity of whole brain areas but not to individual nerve cells. In the fourth chapter
Act describes two experiments and understanding central to defining the role of mirror neurons in the understanding of the purpose underlying the actions. The first revealed the existence of a mirror mechanism not only mode but also auditory and visual motor when the monkey is in darkness and listen to the noise produced by an action: the same neuron "low" when the animal breaks when she sees someone break a peanut and when he hears the sound of someone who breaks. Regardless of how the neuron is activated to encode the abstract concept to "break" that matches the goal with the intention of the action. The second experiment has instead allowed to discriminate between a grasping gesture intended to bring food to your mouth or put it in a container during execution of that action (grasp) mirror neurons are activated in different ways depending on the ultimate goal of the action including his intention to bring food to the mouth or move it to the container. In the same direction seem to get some results with humans from an experiment with fMRI: was noted in the experimental subjects particularly significant activation of the mirror neuron system during observation of actions is not "pure" but placed in the context of actions by which one could infer clearly the intention that there was implied. All of these experiments to indicate that the "mirror neuron system is able to encode not only the act but also noted the intention with which it is finished." In agreement with the paradigm of 'embodied cognition the intentions of others can be included without any conceptual or linguistic reflective mediation: it is a pragmatic understanding "based solely on the motor knowledge on which depends our own capacity to act." In the sixth chapter
Imitation and language are described in two other important functions attributed to the mirror neuron system: an imitative function is understood as the ability to replicate gestures already members of our own motor repertoire is the ability to learn new motor patterns by imitation ; a communicative function that should allow for a possible scenario on the origin of human language related to the evolution of the mirror system.
the theme of sharing emotions is devoted the last chapter of the book: "The recognition of the emotions of others is based on a set of neural circuits that share the property as different mirror already seen in the case of action understanding." was possible to study experimentally some primary emotions: The results clearly show that observed in the other an expression of pain or disgust activates the same neural substrate underlying the perception in the first person of the same type of emotion. Further confirmation comes from clinical trials patients with neurological diseases: a time lost the ability to feel and express a given emotion becomes impossible to recognize even when expressed by others. As in the case of actions for the emotions one can speak of an immediate understanding that does not require cognitive processes of inferential or associative: "The immediate understanding of the emotions of others is the necessary prerequisite for that empathic behavior that underlies a large part of our relations interindividual.
Far from being confined to the functioning of certain nerve cells mirror the properties and then pervade the entire brain system: the same logic that allows coupled execution and action understanding in a single neural mechanism for describing the condivisine emotional and perhaps even the phenomenon of consciousness. In a recent paper published in "Science" Anna Berti neuropsychology has identified a similar mechanism of neural coupling for the execution of actions and awareness of them (or not having) done: the awareness that mobility allows us to be aware of our actions share the same neural substrate underlying the motor control of the shares in question. This happy
publishing operation in which the neuroscientist father of mirror neurons was accompanied by a philosopher is proposed from Cambridge University in the series "Science and Ideas in the theme of interdisciplinarity that is his strong point. However, in this case it is worth reflecting on just how Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia understood the relationship between science and philosophy. At the philosophical method has been given the task almost "editorial" to make clear in the exposition and to ensure appropriate use of terms such as "intend", "pragmatic understanding" or "empathy" which certainly belong to the vocabulary of the philosopher who most of the scientist. About the content no further reference to philosophy (apart from some park reference to the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty) is superimposed on the intrinsic philosophical framework that emerges spontaneously from the exposure of scientific experiments: the proposal of the two authors involves the creation of an interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy and neuroscience, but decided the claim that science is itself philosophy. (Francesca Garbarini, Index)
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